报告人：周德清
报告地点：腾讯会议ID:557 998 950
报告时间：2022年11月19日星期六14:00-15:00
报告摘要:
A dynamic trading framework is built for consensus-biased insiders who observe heterogeneous private signals but mistakenly regard them as homogeneous. A prominent result is that they would exploit most of their information advantage quickly in early stages, absent of the ``waiting game effect" in Foster and Viswanathan (1996) and
analogous to the pattern when insiders are actually homogeneously informed. Moreover, consensus bias can soften the competition and enhance insider profit when trading opportunities are scare.
主讲人简介：
周德清， 中央财经大学金融学院 副教授；研究方向为市场微观结构模型，包括行为金融与内幕交易理论模型。发表SSCI学术期刊论文十多篇， 包括 Economics Letters, Economic Modelling, International Review of Economics and Finance, International Review of Finance, Finance Research Letters, North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica, 出版学术专著四部。主持国家自然科学基金一项，学校 青年创新团队项目一项。
