统计学主题系列报告

Stabilizing the Financial Markets through Informed Trading

报告人:王高望

报告地点:腾讯会议ID:675 116 108

报告时间:2022年11月22日星期二14:00-15:00

 

报告摘要:

We develop a theoretical model of government intervention with information disclosure in which the government with two private signals trades against other market participants to stabilize the financial markets. The government trades optimally based more on the price target than the noisy signal about the fundamentals. Information disclosure does harm to price stability. By revealing more private information in the financial markets, releasing the fundamental signal improves both price efficiency and market liquidity effectively. Releasing the price target signal deteriorates market liquidity and harms price stability, but has little effect on price efficiency. The correlations between the two signals of the government affect financial stability and market quality quantitatively, while exerting small effects on the ranks among four different scenarios.


主讲人简介:


王高望,山东大学经济研究院教授、博士生导师。武汉大学高级研究中心经济学博士,香港大学商学院博士后。在“ Journal of Economic Theory”,“Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control” ,“Economics Letters”,《经济研究》等国内外知名经济学期刊发表近30篇学术论文。主持教育部人文社科青年基金和中国博士后基金面上、特别资助。出版一部专著《重商主义、发展战略与长期增长》,出版两部独立译著《动态优化》和《离散时间的经济动力学》。当前主要关注宏观经济和金融市场中的信息选择和信息决策问题。